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Caveat Venditor:
Technologically Protected Subsidized Goods
and the Customers Who Hack Them
By Christopher Soghoian *
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

This paper focuses on the subsidization of a technology-based durable good. 1 It
goes on to discuss the delicate dance between the producer trying to protect its profit,
competitors trying to create and sell aftermarket goods, 2 and those innovative customers
who use the items in completely unplanned and unprofitable ways.
An age old, but increasingly popular business model involves the subsidization of a
proprietary durable good by a manufacturer, such that the good is sold below cost. 3 Due
to careful design, technological, and legal restrictions, the producer creates a primary
product that is only compatible with its own aftermarket goods. It is through the sale of
these proprietary aftermarket products that the producer is able to recoup its initial
investment. An example of this business model may be seen with the free inkjet printers
that are included with the cost of a new computer but which require proprietary ink refill
cartridges that are sold at a significant markup. This business model is typically referred
to as the razor and blade model, although this term is a somewhat imperfect description. 4
However, since this term is in common use, this paper will continue to use it to refer to
this business model.
In economic terms, when the costs to consumers of aftermarket goods are less than
the cost required to switch to a different and competing primary product, consumers are
said to be “locked in” to the primary durable good and its aftermarket. 5 This “lock in”
*

School of Informatics, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
A durable good is a consumer good (such as vehicles and household appliances) that are typically used
repeatedly over a period of years. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/durables (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
2
An aftermarket is the market for parts and accessories used in the repair or enhancement of a product
or a secondary market available after sales in the original market are finished. Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aftermarket (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
3
An early example of this business model was used by Standard Oil in China in the early 1900s.
Millions of Mei foo kerosene lamps were distributed at a few cents each or were given away with the first
case of kerosene. See ExxonMobilChemical.com, Our History in China (2006),
http://www.exxonmobilchemical.com.cn/ChinaEnglish/LCW/About_ExxonMobil/Our_History_in_China.asp. The lamps “would burn [Standard Oil’s]
brand of kerosene to perfection but, if competing brands were used, would send up such a smoking stench
that Chinese were terrified.” Far Eastern Alliance, TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 28, 1933, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,930122,00.html.
4
Razors are typically not sold at a loss but at a modest profit. Razor companies typically earn the
majority of their profits through the sale of expensive replacement blades. As the razors are not subsidized
and sold below cost, they do not truly reflect the business model that is the focus of this paper.
5
Switching costs include not only the price of a new primary product, but also the inconvenience and
1

46

Vol. 6:1]

¶4

Christopher Soghoian

pricing strategy can fail when competitors begin to produce compatible aftermarket
goods. As such, producers can be extremely protective of their markets, especially when
they have subsidized the primary good and sold it at a loss.
This paper first examines a number of issues that relate to the razor and blade
business model, such as:
(1) what happens when users wish to use the primary good in a way that the
subsidizer had not intended and thus do not purchase the add on-services
upon whose sale the seller is depending;
(2) what happens to the individual users that do this and, more importantly, those
who create and distribute information telling others how to do so; and
(3) what happens to competitors who wish to introduce an aftermarket
replacement good that is designed to work with another firm’s subsidized
primary good? Should this kind of free-riding be allowed? Is it fair that
competitors can undercut the company producing the primary good, since the
competitors do not need to recoup the subsidization cost?

¶5

The second part of this paper recalls a number of struggles between durable good
manufacturers and their hobbyist customers. The third part of this paper goes on to
present a number of legal cases that relate to companies fighting off the efforts of
competitors who seek to sell aftermarket goods targeting the companies’ own subsidized
durable goods. Section four contains an in-depth analysis of a number of the issues that
the previous sections introduced. The paper then concludes with section five.
II. THE RAZOR — CASE STUDIES

¶6

¶7

While there is a fairly significant body of legal history involving companies that try
to compete in each other’s aftermarkets, there is very little in the way of case history
involving customers who tinker with subsidized primary goods. For the companies who
develop these products, such customers are as much of a threat to the the profitability of
the business model as other firms competing for their aftermarket sales. The end result is
the same: an initial product is sold below cost and the company is left with no way to
recoup its initial investment. Some companies have issued legal threats to these
innovative customers who modify the products and, more importantly, those who share
information on the modifications with others. These legal threats have not been followed
up in the courts.
The majority of the following examples involve customers who reverse engineer 6 a
locked-down proprietary product and discover a way for it to serve a completely different
purpose, typically one that does not involve the customer purchasing any further
aftermarket goods. As long as this remains a technically difficult task, it remains
restricted to a small number of technically savvy users and, therefore for the most part, it

additional expenditures required to make a switch. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION
RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 103-04 (Harv. Bus. School 1999).
6
Reverse engineering can be defined generally as a “fair and honest means . . . [of] starting with the
known product and working backwards to divine the process which aided its development or manufacture.”
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
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is not a threat to the manufacturer. However, if the information is distributed in an easy
to use form by hobbyists on the Internet, it can and has in past situations caused
significant financial harm to those companies producing the goods.
This section now explores several instances where a proprietary product was
reverse engineered by hobbyists who had little to no incentive to purchase aftermarket
products. In many ways, this will be a case of David versus Goliath or open source
programmers versus large corporations.
A. Microsoft’s Xbox Versus The Linux Hackers

¶9

Microsoft released the Xbox video gaming system to the U.S. market in November
2001. 7 It was a much hyped and significantly expensive 8 effort to break into the console
gaming market, which at the time was dominated by Sony’s Playstation, 9 and, more
importantly, to gain access to the living room. 10 To do this, Microsoft adopted the typical
business strategy used in the console gaming business: 11 sell the hardware at a loss,
control which software can run on the device, and extract a royalty fee from the makers
of each game sold. 12 Microsoft hoped that it could recoup the costs of its investment
through the sale of games, accessories, and other services. This proved to be a fairly
risky strategy as the company is reported to have lost up to $150 on each XBox. 13
¶10
Given the considerable investment that Microsoft had made in the Xbox product,
the company had a strong incentive to be very protective of the various revenue streams
through which they hoped to recoup their costs and, hopefully, make a significant profit.
Microsoft foresaw a number of potential threats to the financial success of its platform,
7

“Starting Nov. 8, 2001, Xbox consoles will be available for purchase at retail outlets throughout North
America for an estimated retail price of $299.” Press Release, Microsoft (May 16, 2001), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2001/may01/05-16xboxlaunchdetailspr.mspx.
8
“Industry analysts have been estimating that Microsoft will have to absorb losses of $1 billion to $2
billion related to its effort to subsidize for the manufacturing of Xbox . . . . Microsoft also is investing
heavily in marketing and has set aside $500 million to promote Xbox.” Richard Shim, A $500 Million
Gamble, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 15, 2001, http://news.com.com2009-1040-275793.html.
9
“Since the launch [of the Xbox] on Nov. 15 [2001], about 1.5 million consoles have been sold. That
beats Nintendo’s GameCube, which has sold 1.2 million units since its Nov. 18 launch. Meanwhile, Sony’s
PlayStation 2, out since Oct. 25, 2000, sold 2.5 million units in North America this Christmas season.
“While Xbox is designed first and foremost to best PlayStation 2 and GameCube, the connected-home
vision is a constant undercurrent.” Jay Greene et al., Bill Gates in Your Living Room, BUSINESS WEEK
ONLINE, Jan. 21, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_03/b3766095.htm.
10
“With PC sales expected to decline for the second straight year as corporate spending withers,
Microsoft is aiming its big guns on entertainment goodies for the home. It’s spending more than $2 billion
building and marketing its new Xbox game console . . . . Microsoft is counting on Xbox to jump-start its
digital home initiative.” Id.
11
“Like other console makers, Microsoft is subsidizing the cost of the console and hoping to recover its
expenses through sales of game software and the decreasing cost of components over time.” Shim, supra
note 8.
12
“5.5 SOFTWARE TITLE LICENSE . . . . Licensee shall pay Microsoft royalties, on a Software Titleby-Software Title basis, for each Finished Product Unit manufactured . . . .” Xbox Publisher License
Agreement Between Microsoft & Majesco Entertainment Co., available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dsvrn.12Qq.d.htm#1stPage (SEC Exhibit 10.1 filed by Majesco Entertainment
Co.).
13
“As it stands, Microsoft makes a significant loss - thought to be over $150 - on each Xbox console it
sells, and the Home and Entertainment Division of the company, which houses the Xbox project, regularly
turns in large quarterly losses as a result.” Microsoft Pledges to Cut Xbox Costs, THE REGISTER (UK), June
26, 2003, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/06/06/microsoft_pledges_to_cut_xbox/.
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and thus designed a significantly complex Digital Rights Management (DRM) system
which it embedded within the Xbox. It is to these potential threats that this paper now
turns.
B. Region Enforcement
¶11

Price discrimination, the strategy of charging different groups of customers
different prices, is a common practice in many industries. 14 It is a common practice in
the video game industry to lock a consumer device to a specific region, such that games
imported from another part of the world will be rejected by the gaming console. This
allows game producers and distributors to exert a fine level of control over the sale of
their products. Titles can be released at different times in different markets, sold for
different prices, and under different licensing terms. Distributors in foreign markets can
“wait and see,” basing their decision to license and distribute a product based on the
popularity and sales in its primary market.
¶12
A company cannot reasonably expect a software title that is sold for $50 in the
United States to be successful when sold for $50 in a developing market such as China or
Brazil. Recognizing that such high prices often drive customers to piracy, many firms
have introduced cut-price editions of their goods to developing markets. 15 Likewise, in
more expensive markets such as the United Kingdom, companies would ideally like to be
14
“The cost of buying a single song across the 27-nation bloc varies among the available iTunes stores
in EU nations. For example, downloading a single in Britain costs $1.56, in Denmark $1.44, while in
countries using the euro such as Germany and Belgium, a single costs $1.32.” Associated Press, EU Probes
Apple Over iTunes Prices, Apr. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.webdesignbangkok.net/news_EU_probes_Apple_iTunes.php. “[Apple] has sold songs at 99
cents per song since it introduced the [U. S.] iTunes music store in 2003, and has resisted the calls of labels
to change that pricing strategy.” Tom Krazit, Apple, Labels Stick With 99 Cents Per iTunes Song, CNET
NEWS.COM, May 1, 2006,
http://news.com.com/Apple,+labels+stick+with+99+cents+per+iTunes+song/2100-1026_3-6067193.html.
Price discrimination is common, although difficult to enforce, in the pharmaceutical business. See
generally Richard Hornbeck, Price Discrimination and Smuggling of AIDS Drugs, 5 TOPICS IN ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1404 (2005), available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/bep/eaptop/v5y2005i1p14041404.html. “The motion picture studios . . . required that [DVD] technology permit each DVD movie copy
to be coded for decryption in only one of six world regions. In other words, a DVD movie that had been
coded for Region 1 (U.S. & Canada), could not be decrypted and viewed by a DVD player manufactured
for sale in Region 2 (Japan, Europe, South Africa, and the Middle East) . . . .” Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon To
Pay-Per-View: How The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent
Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 25-26 (2002).
15
“[T]extbooks are printed legally in India under copyright arrangements worked out over the last
decade by American and British publishers . . . . Indian companies publish the books in black-and-white,
low-quality paperback editions, and sell them for as little as 10 percent of the cost of the same book in the
United States. But under the licensing agreement, the books may be sold only on the Indian subcontinent
and in surrounding countries — limits that are stamped on the books’ covers.” John O’Neil, Getting
Textbooks Cheaper From India, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/education/29textbooks.html. “[P]irates entered China’s market
because legitimate DVDs were too expensive for the average Chinese consumer, the release dates were too
late, and the demand for films was higher than the available supply. Treating pirates as competitors,
[Warner Home Video China] has lowered its prices, shortened the window between the theatrical release
and DVD release, and offers bonus features . . . [We] released the DVD for Crazy Stone, which was priced
at ¥10- ¥15 [$1.3-$1.9], two weeks after the theatrical release. Crazy Stone did very well at the box office
and on DVD, and because of its quick release date and low price, we were able to outplay the pirates.”
Paula Miller, Reeling in China’s Movie Fans, THE CHINA BUS. REV., Mar. 2007, available at
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0703/miller.html.
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able to sell titles for higher yet typical market rates. 16 Without effective region
enforcement, this significant difference in regional pricing creates a massive incentive for
merchants to engage in arbitrage, which is the importation of products from cheaper
countries to those that are more expensive. 17 A difference in price is not the only reason
that users would wish to import a product from abroad. Customers in foreign markets
often wait significant periods for the release of titles. 18 Furthermore, many titles are
deemed to have too small a market outside of the home-country. If the predicted demand
for a product in one market is too low to make the cost of a release profitable, the rights’
holder will not do so. Fans of obscure and foreign language releases will be left with a
problem: there may not be enough potential customers to justify a legitimate release in
their market, but due to the region coding scheme on the discs, an imported copy will not
play.
¶13
All of these factors (price, distribution schedules, and the availability of obscure
foreign titles) add up to a strong incentive for customers to find a way to work around the
DRM scheme that is the backbone of region lock enforcement.
C. Hobbyist Created Games
¶14

Microsoft’s business model depended on it getting a license fee from each software
title that was sold for the Xbox platform. This had the unfortunate side-effect of locking
out hobbyists, college students and independent software developers who wished to make
games and give them away for free.
D. Linux

¶15

A version of the Linux operating system has been created for almost every platform
imaginable. This includes previous console gaming systems, 19 the Apple iPod, 20 and
16

A copy of the Guitar Hero II game and game controller for the Xbox 360 currently sells for $84.99 on
Amazon.com (U. S.), while the European region edition sells for the equivalent of just over $132.84. Even
including international shipping fees, without region controls, it would be cheaper for UK customers to
order a copy from American online retailers. Compare Amazon, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Nov.
17, 2007) with Amazon UK, http://www.amazon.co.uk (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
17
“If pills cost 50 cents in Congo but $5,000 in New York City, there’s a very strong incentive to jump
on a plane in Congo with a bagful and resell them in New York.” Lawrence Lessig, Stop Making Pills
Political Prisoners, WIRED, Feb. 2004, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.02/view.html?pg=5.
18
“Huge delays in airing overseas TV shows locally are turning Australians into pirates, says a study
conducted by technology lawyer and researcher Alex Malik. It took an average of 17 months for programs
to be shown in Australia after first airing overseas . . . . These delays are one of the major factors driving
Australians to use BitTorrent and other internet-based peer-to-peer programs to download programs
illegally from overseas, prior to their local broadcast.” Asher Moses, TV Program Delays ‘Turning Viewers
Into Pirates’, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/hometheatre/tv-program-delays-turning-viewers-into-pirates/2007/02/20/1171733750719.html.
19
“[Sony] announced today that it is set to release ‘Linux (for PlayStation 2)’ Release 1.0, targeted
toward the Linux development community in North America. Designed as a hobbyist development
environment, users can not only run the wide variety of computer applications written for the Linux
operating system, but also create original programs and applications designed to run on [Linux] . . . .” Press
Release, Sony Computer Entertainment America (May 10, 2000), available at
http://http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104 STORY=/www/story/01-302002/0001658223.
20
See generally The iPodLinux Project Main Page, http://ipodlinux.org/Main_Page (last visited Nov. 7,
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even a toaster oven. 21 Much of the motivation for making Linux compatible with obscure
platforms is due to the “hack factor,” or pleasure derived from the intellectual challenge
of reverse engineering an unknown platform. The Linux operating system has its roots in
the open source community, and the process of reverse engineering is one that is very
familiar to many Linux developers.
¶16
The Xbox was seen as an ideal Linux platform. It was a small device, wellengineered with good hardware, and it included the ability to output video to a television.
It was seen as a perfect platform for a living room Linux computer, suitable for surfing
the web and watching movies from the sofa. Due to the combination of a per-device
subsidy by Microsoft, as well as the economy of scale savings achieved through mass
production, a hacked Xbox made for a much cheaper home media platform than building
one using off-the-shelf computer components. Shortly after the launch of the Xbox, the
CEO of the Lindows Linux Software company announced two prizes of $100,000 each:
one to the first person to show a copy of Linux running on the Xbox and another to the
first person able to run Linux on the Xbox without any hardware modifications. 22
E. Copied Games And Backups
¶17

The final, and most high profile of the threats to the Xbox revenue stream came
from those who wished to play either fair use backups of their games, or more often,
illegally made copies. Previous game platforms had suffered from design flaws and
clever hacks that allowed players to play such copies.23 The majority of these hacks
required so-called “mod-chips,” a computer microchip that had to be invasively installed
into the game console. 24 After installing one of these hacks, or modifying the game
console, a user could “burn” a copy of a game to compact disc and then use that copy to
play the game in the future. With video rental stores such as Blockbuster also supplying
a rapidly expanding video game rental market, this meant that someone could rent a
game, make a copy, return the copy, and then keep playing that game, all without the
game copyright owner and Microsoft receiving the payments they were expecting. As
the Xbox came with a hard disk built into the device, the threat of hacked backups was a
significant one. Were Microsoft’s security system compromised, users would then be
able to copy games to the Xbox’s hard disk and then play the games directly off the
system in the future. The purchase or rental price of a single game could be spread
among a group of friends. Worse, the data files for illegally copied games could be
spread on the Internet for people to download en masse.

2007).
21
See generally K12Linux in Schools Project: Toaster Oven Terminal Server Linux Appliance,
http://web.archive.org/web/20060923005902/http://www.riverdale.k12.or.us/linux/toaster/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2007).
22
See generally Lindows Founder Offered Xbox Linux $200,000 Prize, THE INQUIRER, Jan. 2, 2003,
available at http://www.theinquirer.net/en/inquirer/news/2003/01/02/lindows-founder-offered-xbox-linux200000-prize.
23
See How to Backup PSX Games, July 18, 2001, http://www.dlc.fi/~ihra/psx_copy.htm.
24
See generally Vijay G. Brijbasi, Comment, Game Console Modification Chips: The Effect of Fair Use
and The Digital Millennium Copyright Act on The Circumvention of Game Console Security Measures, 28
NOVA L. REV. 411 (2004); see Andrew Leung, Modchips on Trial, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 24 (2003).
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F. Breaking The Security Of The Xbox
¶18

Microsoft opted to protect its platform against all four of the previously described
threats with one technical solution: any software that ran on the XBox needed to be
“digitally signed” by Microsoft. Without a valid digital signature, the software would be
rejected by the Xbox. 25 To protect its revenue, Microsoft would only issue a digital
signature to those software firms that obtained a license from Microsoft and thus agreed
to pay royalties.
¶19
The problem of this approach, of course, is that the four different groups, which
would normally have very little in common, were now motivated to share information
and target the one security system holding them back. While those users who wished to
play illegal copies of games were motivated by their desire to avoid paying for software,
the other three groups had more personal motivations: creativity, and the desire to do
what they felt was their right. Furthermore, both the Linux community and the hobbyist
game developer community include skilled and motivated programmers — who by
definition — spend their time working on projects for free. In creating a single DRM
system, Microsoft inadvertently aligned the “software pirates” with a team of skilled
open-source programmers with significant experience in reverse engineering proprietary
systems. This is the very same design mistake that was made by the creators of the DVD
DRM system. 26
¶20
The first breach of Microsoft’s DRM came from the mod-chip community, but did
not pose a significant threat to Microsoft due to the difficult process that installing such a
chip required. 27 In July of 2003, the Free-X project announced that its members had
figured out a way to get Linux running on the XBox without any hardware
modifications. 28 The developers were able to exploit a flaw in one of the system’s games
using a “buffer overflow,” a technique commonly used in the computer security
community. 29 Once they had successfully created a software-based hack, the Linux
developers gave Microsoft an ultimatum: release a digital signature for the Linux

25
See generally Michael Steil, 17 Mistakes Microsoft Made in the Xbox Security System, Oct. 25, 2005,
http://www.xbox-linux.org/wiki/17_Mistakes_Microsoft_Made_in_the_Xbox_Security_System.
26
The groups wishing to break the DVD DRM system consisted of: those wishing to play imported
DVDs from other regions, those wishing to make copies of DVDs either for backup or “piracy,” and those
wishing to play DVDs on the Linux operating system. It was a Linux programmer who released the first
program to break the DVD DRM system, DeCSS, although his efforts provided spill-over benefits to those
other interested parties. See generally Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
27
“The Xtender, a ‘mod chip’ intended to be added to the main circuit board of the Xbox, went on sale
last weekend . . . . Most of the mod chips promise similar functions based on disabling copy-protection
features built into the Xbox. Customers are promised the ability to play games copied on recordable CD
and DVD discs (and perhaps swapped as files on the Internet), play otherwise inaccessible foreign titles,
and copy DVD movie discs otherwise protected by software from Macrovision . . . . For starters, using the
mod chips requires disassembling the Xbox case and affixing the chip to the circuit board, a task that can
require more than 20 soldering connections.” David Becker, Xbox Hacking Not For Amateurs, CNET
NEWS.COM, May 29, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1040-924666.html.
28
“A group of Xbox hackers called ‘Free-X’ claim to have broken all security measures on the games
console without any hardware modifications whatsoever, prompting Microsoft to threaten a legal attack
against its members.” Patrick Gray, Hackers Release Xbox Tool Despite Microsoft Threats, ZDNET
AUSTRALIA, July 4, 2003, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/software/0,1000000121,2137053,00.htm?r=1.
29
See Aleph One, Smashing The Stack For Fun and Profit, 7 PHRACK 49,
http://www.phrack.org/archives/49/P49-14.
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operating system, which would enable users to legitimately run Linux on the Xbox
without having to evade the DRM system or else the developers would release a working
implementation of the evasion system to the Internet. 30
¶21
Microsoft refused and so the developers made good on their threat. Other
developers took advantage of this information, and thus a number of development
communities sprung up around the Xbox. 31 This included the Xbox Media Center, an
open-source media player capable of playing videos, multi-region DVDs, streaming
video and radio from the Internet, and podcasts. 32 Those wishing to play copied games,
both fair use backups and illegal copies, also benefited. 33 In many ways, the software
pirates were able to free-ride on the efforts of the Linux hobbyists, although Microsoft
attempted to portray them in the media as one and the same. 34
G. i-Opener
¶22

The i-Opener was an Internet appliance, 35 a locked-down Intel Pentium PC
designed for web browsing and email, that was released to the US market in November of
1999. 36 The device had limited storage, did not have a hard disk, and stored everything
in internal memory. Shortly after launching, the company dropped the price of their
device to $99, 37 although reports indicated that the cost to NetPliance (now Tippingpoint,
a division of 3Com) for each unit was $400.38
30

“Free-X had been trying to negotiate with Microsoft, and was requesting the release of a ‘signed’
Linux boot loader, which would allow Xbox owners to run the open-source operating system without any
hardware modifications or the exploitation of the console. Microsoft would not negotiate, group members
have told ZDNet Australia. Group representatives reject claims they are encouraging piracy and accuse the
software company of failing to protect its game developers’ intellectual property. A signed boot loader
won’t allow the console to run pirated games, whereas the exploit they have developed will. Free-X say
piracy is not something they wish to encourage.” Gray, supra note 28.
31
See generally The Xbox Linux Project, http://www.xbox-linux.org/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Oct.
26, 2007); Emulators for Xbox, http://worldofstuart.excellentcontent.com/xemus/xbox/xemus.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2007).
32
See generally The Xbox Media Center Project, http://www.xboxmediacenter.com (last visited Oct. 26,
2007).
33
See generally Hsdemonz, The Complete Guide to Producing, Extracting, and Burning XBOX ISO
Image Files v0.07, Nov. 21, 2002, http://www.xbox-scene.com/articles/iso-backup-guide.php.
34
“‘We do need to inform you[] . . . that Microsoft Xbox takes pirating of videogames very seriously,’ a
Microsoft spokeswoman told ZDNet Australia by email. ‘The protection of our intellectual properties and
copyrights, and those of our partners, is a top priority and therefore we reserve the right to pursue and take
action against anyone facilitating piracy of videogames.’” Gray, supra note 28.
35
“Web appliances are cheap, easy-to-use terminals that offer Net access with the flick of a switch.
Designed to lure the technologically inexperienced online, they embody much of the promise and risk of
the Net Economy.” Dominic Gates, It Slices, Dices, Blends - and Surfs, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 1, 2000,
http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;1099099935.
36
“In November 1999 we launched our i-Opener service, an all-in-one Internet experience integrating an
Internet appliance, access, and consumer portal. Our approach avoids the technological complexities
generally associated with using personal computers, or PCs, and traditional Web browsers to access the
Internet. We believe our solution provides a simple, seamless and relevant experience that appeals to both
new and existing Internet users.” SEC Form S-1/A (filed by Netpliance Inc. on Jan. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1097297/0000950109-00-000142.txt.
37
“The i-Opener was first announced in July 1999. The company set the appliance’s retail price at $399
with monthly access fees ranging from $4.95 to $24.95 depending on the number of family members
accessing email and customized content . . . . By the time the i-opener hit the market in November,
Netpliance had cut the sticker price in half and flattened the access packages to a flat $21.95 . . . . [O]n
March 1, they decreased the retail price once more, this time announcing a 50% off sale that would price
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The i-Opener, out of the box, was useless, unless a user subscribed to the dial-up
internet service that NetPliance also provided for $22 per month. The device was locked
so that it could not connect to any other Internet service provider. 39 NetPliance’s own
IPO registration statement summed up their business model:
We currently price our i-Opener Internet appliance below our cost and expect to
continue to subsidize the purchase price of our appliance for the foreseeable
future. At current pricing levels, a new customer must pay monthly fees for our
service for a significant period of time before we recover the purchase price
subsidy on that customer’s appliance . . . . If we are unable to achieve sufficient
revenues from user fees and other sources to cover the subsidies of appliance
purchases, we may never become profitable and our business model could fail. 40

¶24

In February 2000, Ken Segler, a slot-machine designer from Las Vegas and an avid
technology hobbyist, posted instructions on his website detailing the process for making a
cable that could connect an off the shelf hard disk to the i-Opener and install the Linux
operating system onto the device. 41 In addition to the instructions, he also offered to sell
the cables himself. Within a week, over 100,000 people had visited his website 42 after
news of his hack was posted to the front page of “Slashdot.org,” a major technology news
website. 43 Within a short period of time, Circuit City stores, the primary retailer of the
device, had sold out of the item. 44 Segler himself sold over 200 cables, at $35 each
within four days of posting the instructions online. 45
the unit at $99, just one quarter of their originally planned price. At this stage, analysts agreed that the
company was losing hundreds of dollars per unit.” Kalin R. Harvey, The i-opener and Open Source,
FRESHMEAT, Apr. 8, 2000, http://freshmeat.net/articles/view/154/.
38
Posting of John Rohner, former Netpliance engineer, to freshmeat.net: Editorials — The i-Opener and
Open Source, http://freshmeat.net/articles/view/154/ (Apr. 10, 2000, 14:53:54), “In March of 1999 I joined
the forming company now called Netpliance as their one and only Hardware and Firmware design
engineer. The I Opener [sic] is the product of my design efforts . . . . The price of each i-Opener from their
Taiwanese manufacturer is $403.”
39
“[O]ur i-Opener Internet appliance comes prepackaged with Internet access delivered over a
nationwide dial-up network.” Netpliance Inc. SEC Form S-1/A, supra note 36. “The i-Opener will not
work with other Internet service providers, however, making a subscription effectively mandatory.” Ian
Fried, Netpliance Quadruples Price of i-Opener Internet Device, CNET NEWS.COM, July 5 2000,
http://news.com.com/Netpliance+quadruples+price+of+i-Opener+Internet+device/2100-1040_3242786.html.
40
Netpliance Inc. SEC Form S-1/A, supra note 36.
41
“In mid-February, Las Vegas electronics engineer Ken Segler walked into his local Circuit City store,
ordered a computer — and unwittingly kicked off a small phenomenon. When his order arrived, he
tweaked a simple connector cable and turned what was meant to be a closed Internet access ‘appliance’ —
the $99 Netpliance i-opener — into a fully functional, Pentium I-class PC. He published news of his
discovery online and soon others were replicating his work.” An I-Opening Hack: $200 PC, WIRED, Mar.
16, 2000, http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2000/03/34977.
42
“Segler has received about 400 emails from system administrators and attorneys — one from a
Cornell University professor — inquiring about the cable and his work tweaking the computer. His
information page has been hit 100,000 times since Saturday.” Id.
43
Posting of Hemos to http://slashdot.org/linux/00/03/11/1216231.shtml (Mar. 11, 2000).
44
“Within days of Ken’s site being featured on the [Slashdot.org] site, pockets of Circuit City stores
around the country began to sell out of i-Openers (reportedly the first areas to sell out were in cities that
had large research universities nearby).” Harvey, supra note 37.
45
“Four days later, Segler had taken orders for 200 of his modified cables he’d offered for sale at $35 a
piece. The cables’ connectors are modified to allow the connection of a basic hard disk to the i-Opener,
which can then be booted using the user’s operating system of choice — Windows, Linux, even the BeOS.”
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¶25

Rapidly, forums and online communities popped up where users exchanged
information on modifying the devices and upgrading them. 46 Users added ethernet
network cards, transforming i-Openers into network terminals. 47 Others turned them into
car mp3 players and mobile computers. 48 All of these modified devices, for the most
part, would not connect to the Netpliance dial-up network, and thus, there would be no
subscriber fees to enable the company to recoup its subsidization costs. The devices were
sold without any “terms of service” or contract requiring customers to sign up for the
internet access service. Customers could walk into Circuit City, pay $100 in cash, and
walk out with a device without Netpliance ever learning who had purchased one of their
products.
¶26
Within a month, Netpliance revised its business model and instituted a “terms of
service” agreement and contract. Customers purchasing the device online from the
company’s website had to agree to a number of terms. These included:
By purchasing the i-Opener you are agreeing to use the i-Opener Internet service.
The fee is $21.95 a month and will be billed approximately 2 days after the iOpener is shipped to you. If you decide to deactivate your account within 90
days of receipt, a deactivation fee of $499 will be billed to your credit card. 49

Netpliance reserved the right to charge customers a termination fee of $499 if the
customer violated the “terms of service” agreement. In particular, these terms barred
customers from “dissembling, reverse engineering, modifying, adapt or otherwise alter
the device.” 50 Furthermore, “unauthorized dissemination of trade secrets” was also
against the terms, which would probably include telling others how to hack the device. 51
¶27
Netpliance presumably hoped that the contract would do something to stem the
more egregious abuses of their business model. Some customers had reportedly been
purchasing nine devices at a time. 52 As Netpliance only required that customers purchase
three months of internet service, the company would still only make an additional $65
minus whatever costs were associated with providing Internet access. It certainly did not
begin to recoup the $300 that the company was reportedly subsidizing for each device. In
July of 2000, Netpliance again changed its business model and began selling the device
for $399. 53 By November of 2000, the company laid off over a third of its work-force, 54
WIRED, supra note 41.
46
See i-Opener Running OS’s, http://www.linux-hacker.net/imod/imod.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2007);
see generally i-Opener Info Index, Apr. 2, 2000, http://www.evernex.com/iopener/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2007).
47
See generally i-Opener as a Thin Client, http://ltsp.sourceforge.net/documentation/iopener.php (last
visited Oct. 26, 2007).
48
See generally Mouning [sic] My i-Opener in My Truck!,
http://home.socal.rr.com/joekewl/io/truckstuff.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
49
Fred Maxwell, Expanding the Netpliance i-Opener, Feb. 8, 2004,
http://www.geocities.com/iopener_hack/.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
“The result was something of a mini nationwide run on the computer, with some customers buying
nine of [sic] i-Openers at a time.” Netpliance Zaps Cheap PC Buzz, WIRED, Mar. 23, 2000,
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2000/03/35156.
53
See generally Fried, supra note 39.
54
“Austin’s Netpliance Inc. says it will lay off 76 workers, or 54 percent of its work force, to reduce
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and by January 2001, the company ceased selling the i-Opener device after its shares had
sunk below the $1 level, and risked being de-listed from NASDAQ. 55
¶28
While some hackers were motivated by the price because, while at $99, the iOpener was the cheapest Linux platform on the market, others were motivated by the
“hack factor” as well as the elegance of the device. It was compact, well-designed, and
with a bit of tinkering, was perfect for mobile and in-car use. Several hackers mentioned
that they would be happy to pay full price for the devices, but that this was not an
option. 56 Netpliance never gave consumers a choice by offering to sell the device at a
profit without the required Internet service.
H. Sony Aibo
¶29

The AIBO (Artificial Intelligence Robot) was a product line of several robotic pets
designed and sold by Sony. They were first introduced by Sony in 1999 and then later
discontinued in 2006. 57 The robots were able to “see” their environment with a built-in
camera, recognize verbal commands, express emotion as well as learn and mature based
on experiences. Each AIBO had a unique personality shaped by the interactions with
their owners. Sony sold over 100,000 of the devices, priced between $850 to $1,500
each. 58
¶30
In addition to selling the robots, Sony sold add-on software that enabled the robots
to assume different personality types as well as perform tricks. Software was loaded onto
the robot via a proprietary memory stick which Sony also sold. 59 An enthusiastic
community sprang up around the AIBO, and as early adopters are often those most
technically skilled, people began to tinker with the software. One particular individual,
who was only ever known by his online handle “AiboPet,” reached a level of extreme
skill in AIBO hacking. 60
¶31
AiboPet reverse engineered Sony’s software and hardware, and soon produced a
software package that enabled AIBO owners to teach their pets to dance, speak, obey

annual expenses by $6 million. In November, Netpliance cut about 90 employees.” Netpliance to Lay Off
76; President Quits, AUSTIN BUS. J., Feb. 2, 2001, available at
http://austin.bizjournals.com/austin/stories/2001/01/29/daily27.html.
55
See generally Maxwell, supra note 49.
56
“A large number of these people publicly stated that they would have been more than willing to have
[paid] $300 for the same hardware with a basic modification kit. They didn’t want to rip Netpliance off;
they just really liked the design of the device and the potential it had. An inexpensive Linux terminal, it
turns out, represents quite an untapped market.” Harvey, supra note 37.
57
“As part of its ongoing cost-cutting and reorganization effort, Sony has cut its line of robotic Aibo
dogs. According to a company representative, more than 150,000 Aibos have been sold since they went on
the market in 1999.” John Borland, Sony Puts Aibo to Sleep, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 26, 2006,
http://news.com.com/Sony+puts+Aibo+to+sleep/2100-1041_3-6031649.html.
58
“Aibos, the first mass-produced entertainment robot, have grown in popularity in the three years since
they were introduced, with more than 100,000 of the creatures — which cost from $850 to $1,500 — sold
worldwide.” Eric A. Taub, Silicon Pets, But the Pride Is Real, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2002, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/02/technology/circuits/02AIBO.html.
59
“Programming embedded in removable memory chips instructs Aibo how to respond to voices,
sounds or visual stimuli and, depending on which program is used, simulate the maturation process.” Id.
60
See generally David Labrador, Teaching Robot Dogs New Tricks, SCIENTIFIC AM., Jan. 21, 2001,
available at http://www.sciam.com/explore_directory.cfm (select year 2002; then select third page of
search results).
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wireless commands, and even share the video used for the robot’s vision. 61 While
AiboPet had reverse engineered the copy-protection scheme used to lock down Sony’s
propriety memory cards, he did not release this information. The software that he
released required a legitimate Sony memory card for each trick that the user wished to
install. AiboPet’s software stimulated demand for Sony memory sticks, as many fans
claimed. 62 AiboPet released his software for free and earned no money from his efforts.
¶32
In October of 2002, Sony lawyers notified AiboPet that he was violating the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and demanded that he remove all software from his
website that was based on Sony’s proprietary code. 63 The author pulled his code, but
spread the word of Sony’s actions online. Soon a mass protest by thousands of Aibo
owners took place, until, finally, Sony backed down. 64 Within a matter of months, Sony
and AiboPet worked out a deal that enabled him to put most of his programs back online.
As part of the terms of their deal, AiboPet permitted Sony to adopt and sell any of his
ideas and code, should the company wish to do so, royalty-free. 65 While there is no
information to suggest that Sony lost money on sales of Aibo, it certainly intended for
people to purchase one or more of the many add-on software packages for the robot —
which were priced at up to $150 each.
¶33
While the AiboPet episode ended in favor of consumers, for the most part, it does
at least demonstrate the fact that consumers often have different intentions for a product
than the company that makes them. In this case, Sony was profiting from the initial sale
of the robot, so it did not lose any money through the tinkering by users. Sony also sold
software for the Aibo and a good argument could be made for the fact that the software
that Sony sold and that made by the community were compliments, not substitutes. By
and large, people created software to satisfy needs that Sony itself had ignored.
Furthermore, the software could only be installed by using a Sony manufactured memory
stick, thus meaning that Sony profited even when it did not own the software. This
incident was never a case about piracy, merely Sony’s desire to retain full control over its
platform.
I. Prepaid Phones
¶34

In August of 2006, three Arab-American men were arrested in Michigan with over
1000 prepaid mobile phones, most of which had been purchased at Wal-Mart stores
61

“AiboPet violated that copyright when he cracked the robot’s source code to reverse-engineer
software that allows Aibo owners to teach their pets to dance, speak, obey wireless commands and share
the color video that serves as their vision, among other things. None of the programs are usable without
Sony hardware and software. They earned AiboPet no money. He never revealed the encryption code or the
program he used to defeat it.” Id.
62
“If it had not been for AiboPet’s information, his invaluable knowledge and his generosity in sharing
it with the Aibo community, I would not have purchased an Aibo, all the various software, [memory] sticks
and yes, even my computer, a Sony VAIO, which I only purchased because of its stick reader.” Id.
63
“[Y]our site still contains information providing the means to circumvent AIBO-ware’s copy
protection protocol constituting a violation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.” Letter from Victor Matsuda, Vice President, Entertainment Robot America, Sony
Electronics, Inc. to Aibopet (Oct. 24, 2001) (on file with author), available at
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DMCA/AiboHack/letter2.htm.
64
Farhad Manjoo, Aibo Owners Biting Mad at Sony, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 2, 2001,
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2001/11/48088.
65
See generally Labrador, supra note 60.
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around the state. 66 Local prosecutors initially charged them with collecting or providing
materials for terrorist acts, although, these charges were later dropped. 67 Federal
prosecutors then took an interest in the case and accused the men of defrauding
companies TracFone Wireless Inc. and Nokia Corp. by buying the prepaid phones and
removing TracFone’s proprietary software, making it possible to use the handsets with
any cellular provider. A federal judge eventually threw out all of the charges. 68
¶35
Prepaid mobile phone carriers are a recent arrival to the mobile phone business.
They target low income customers who may not have a good credit history or for whom a
monthly bill is not practical. Customers purchase a phone from the carrier and then buy
“refill cards” which enable them to use additional minutes of service. Prepaid mobile
phone carriers sell subsidized handsets that are locked to their network. 69 The phones,
often popular models by brands such as Nokia and Sony Erikson, are identical at the
hardware level to models used on other networks but contain specific software that
prevents them from being used with other mobile phone carriers’ networks. The phones
are typically purchased in bulk for between $80 to $100 by the prepaid carriers, who
install custom software on them, and then resell them to customers for between $20 to
$70. The service providers hope to make back their investment by charging a significant
markup for the telephone service. 70
¶36
The three men from Michigan were engaged in a modified form of arbitrage: they
bought heavily subsidized devices, removed the software, and resold them to consumers
wishing to use them on other networks. Tracfone, the company whose telephones the
men had purchased, claims that it has lost millions of dollars because of the practice. 71
J. Why Phones Are Different
¶37

The typical threat faced by durable good manufacturers is that parasitic competitors
will reverse engineer their products, create a compatible add-on service, and then siphon
off customers. Through this process, such competitors can free-ride on the subsidy that
the manufacturer has placed in each durable good, and thus out-compete on the add-on
service, since they do not have any investment that they need to recoup. The prepaid
phone business is different, primarily due to the segmentation and structure of the mobile
66

Jason Trahan, Family, Friends Deny Terror Ties: 3 Accused of Buying Up Cellphones, Targeting
Michigan Bridge, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 13, 2006, at 1B, available at
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/081306dnmetterrorcharges.19bb76b.h
tml.
67
Michigan Prosecutor Dropping Terror Case, USA TODAY, Aug. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-08-16-cellphones-terror-charges_x.htm.
68
“A federal judge threw out conspiracy and money laundering charges Tuesday against three Texas
men who originally were accused of planning terrorism, saying there wasn’t enough evidence to bring them
to trial.” Judge Throws Out Cell-Phone Case, WIRED, Sept. 5, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/09/71726.
69
“[M]any cellular companies set software locks to control access to their phones, often preventing
users from taking that device and using it on a competitor’s network.” Phuong Cat Le, Victory for Cell
Phone Users: Ruling Allows Them to Break ‘Lock’ and Switch Carriers, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Nov. 28, 2006, at B1, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/293875_unlock28.html.
70
“[P]repaid phones cost the companies that make them around $80 to $100. They then sell the phones
for less — $20 to $70 — in hopes that customers will continue to load more minutes onto the phone,
making the company money.” Jamie Stengle, Bulk Cell-Phone Buys Likely for Resale, Not Terror, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, Aug. 17, 2006, http://www.azstarnet.com/news/142484.
71
Id.
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phone market: one set of firms produce the handsets, and another completely different set
of firms provide the wireless service. Thus, the wireless service firms all purchase fairly
generic inter-operable mobile phone handsets and then attempt to proprietize them
through the addition of software locks. Customers who are able to remove this software
can, of course, revert these phones back to their previously compatible-with-all-networks
status.
¶38
At the hardware level, a phone sold by one wireless company will operate on any
other wireless network that uses the same underlying network technology. All of the
mobile phone network companies subsidize their telephones, but unlike the prepaid
market, the more traditional phone model requires that customers typically sign a contract
for phone service. Customers who leave before their contract is up are required to pay a
termination fee. Thus, the carriers can be assured that they will recoup the phone
subsidization costs, either through the monthly fees charged to customers or through a
significant termination fee. Prepaid customers do not sign a contract, and therefore the
prepaid operators take on a significant risk. Customers can purchase a phone, with no
intention to purchase telephone service and keep the companies from recouping their
costs. Some prepaid providers reacted to this by sending DMCA cease-and-desist letters
to companies that sold phone unlocking software. 72
¶39
In November 2006, the Librarian of Congress settled the issue by creating a new
exemption to the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. The new rule explicitly
permits customers to circumvent the technological protection measures in their mobile
phones in order to switch carriers and use the phone on a different network. This was
primarily due to petitions from business travelers who wished to use their phones when
traveling abroad, and from non-profit groups concerned that useful phones were ending
up in landfills. 73
III. THE RAZOR BLADES
A. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.
¶40

Nintendo of America (“Nintendo”) is a manufacturer of console video game
systems including the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES). It has produced games for
those devices and sold licenses to other companies enabling them to produce games that
would play on Nintendo’s hardware. Each Nintendo game cartridge contained two readonly memory (ROM) microchips: a character ROM containing audio-visual information
and a game ROM containing the rules and methods of play. Lewis Galoob Toys
manufactured a “Game Genie” device, that would enable consumers, through the use of
“programming codes” to modify otherwise-unmodifiable parameters in their favorite
games. Such modifiable features included accessing levels, bonus features, extra lives,
etc. The Game Genie did this by intercepting the communication stream between
Nintendo’s game cartridges and the NES console. The Game Genie allowed direct,

72
See generally Jennifer Granick, Free the Cell Phone!, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 28, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/commentary/circuitcourt/2005/09/68989.
73
See generally Jennifer Granick, Cell Phones Freed! Poor Suffer?, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 6, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/commentary/circuitcourt/2006/12/72241.
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untampered access to the game’s character ROM, but would intercept and modify on-thefly the communication stream between the game console and the game’s data ROM. 74
¶41
Nintendo filed a suit in which it accused Lewis Galoob Toys of contributory
copyright infringement. Nintendo claimed that Lewis Galoob Toys sold consumers the
Game Genie knowing that consumers would use the device to alter the copyrighted
audiovisual sequences in Nintendo’s games and as a consequence, create unauthorized
derivative works. The district court compared the Game Genie to children modifying the
rules to a copyrighted board game, a use which Nintendo admitted would not infringe on
a game designer’s copyright. The District Court noted that:
[b]ecause of the technology involved, owners of videogames are less able to
experiment with or change the method of play, absent an electronic accessory
such as the Game Genie. This should not mean that holders of copyrighted video
games are entitled to broader protections or monopoly rights than holders of
other types of copyrighted games . . . . Having paid Nintendo a fair return, the
consumer may experiment with the product and create new variations of play, for
personal enjoyment, without creating a derivative work. 75

¶42

Nintendo was unable to provide any proof that the Game Genie had diminished or
displaced the sales of legitimate games. Customers were not choosing to purchase the
Game Genie in lieu of Nintendo’s games, as the Game Genie, by itself, was nonfunctional. The Game Genie needed a game console and a legitimate game to function.
Furthermore, Nintendo was unable to provide any proof that it had plans to market games
with modifications similar to those that the Game Genie provided. As such, Nintendo
was unable to successfully claim that the Game Genie interfered with its own
opportunities to sell altered games. Finally, as the Game Genie only modified bits in the
communication stream between the game console and the game ROM, there was no
derivative work created. After using a Game Genie, a user’s game cartridge would have
the same data contained within it as when it was purchased from Nintendo, as the Game
Genie did not make any permanent changes, nor did it write any data to the game
cartridge itself. While the game code being executed by the game console was slightly
different than the code supplied by Nintendo, this would disappear once the game was
powered off. Without a fixation, there could be no successful claim of a derivative work.
The circuit court therefore reversed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction
against Lewis Galoob Toys. 76
B. Sega v. Accolade

¶43

Sega Enterprises, Ltd. (“Sega”) manufactured the Sega Genesis Video Game
System as well as producing a number of the games that ran on the system. Sega offered
licenses to other companies, which would permit them to produce games for the Sega
platform. As part of the license requirement terms, Sega required that game producers
exclusively create and release games for the Sega platform, and no competing game
system. The Genesis game platform enforced Sega’s licensing scheme by refusing to
74

See generally Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1994).
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
76
Id.
75
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execute games which did not contain a specific section of computer code. Sega provided
this code sequence to all of its licensees. Accolade, Inc. (“Accolade”) produced games
for a number of game systems, including other platforms — not including the Genesis —
of Sega’s. It did not license the rights to produce games for Sega’s Genesis platform, and
instead its staff reverse engineered a number of Sega games to determine the methods
required to interface a game with the Genesis platform. 77
¶44
Sega sued Accolade because Accolade made a limited number of copies of Sega
games during the process of reverse engineering them. Furthermore, Accolade included a
short sequence of Sega’s code, in order to emulate a licensed game, and trick the Genesis
console into executing unlicensed games. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and noted that
Accolade’s reverse engineering “led to an increase in the number of independently
designed video game programs offered for use with the Genesis console. It is precisely
this growth in creative expression . . . that the Copyright Act was intended to promote.” 78
¶45
The Court further confirmed Accolade’s right to reverse engineer for the purpose of
inter-operability by writing, “If disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair
use, the owner of the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of
his work — aspects that were expressly denied copyright protection by Congress.” 79 In
order to gain a lawful monopoly over the functional principles underlying a work “the
creator of the work must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the patent
laws.” 80
C. Lexmark
¶46

Lexmark International Inc, (“Lexmark”), a major printer manufacturer, introduced
a new line of printers in 2001 which included DRM technology. Each Lexmark made
printer cartridge contained a microchip that would malfunction when refurbished by a
third party. Lexmark’s printers were engineered to detect the presence of a microchip
and would reject any cartridge that lacked the microchip, or which had been refilled by a
third party. Neither the printer nor the cartridge, both of which contained computer code
copyrighted by Lexmark, would function until they had performed a mutual
authentication process. 81
¶47
Lexmark did not adopt this business model for every consumer printer it sold. This
was restricted solely to a “prebate” program, in which it would provide consumers with
up to a $50 saving over the purchase price of printer cartridges. Such prebate cartridges
were sold in boxes that contained a “shrinkwrap” license agreement which required the
consumer to use the cartridge only once, and to return it to Lexmark when it was used. 82
77

See generally Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1523.
79
Id. at 1536.
80
Id.
81
See generally Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
82
Lexmark’s subsidized printer cartridges were sold in a box that contained the following license:
“RETURN EMPTY CARTRIDGE TO LEXMARK FOR REMANUFACTURING AND RECYCLING.
Please read before opening. Opening this package or using the patented cartridge inside confirms your
acceptance of the following license/agreement. This all-new cartridge is sold at a special price subject to a
restriction that it may be used only once. Following this initial use, you agree to return the empty cartridge
only to Lexmark for remanufacturing and recycling. If you don’t accept these terms, return the unopened
package to your point of purchase. A regular price cartridge without these terms is available (emphasis
78
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While every print cartridge sold by Lexmark included one of their DRM microchips, the
Lexmark-only functionality was only enabled in those subsidized prebate cartridges.
Thus, consumers had a choice: purchase a printer sold at a profit from Lexmark, and use
any cartridges they wish, or purchase a subsidized printer from Lexmark, and agree to
purchase cartridges from Lexmark only.
Static Control Components, Inc. (“SCC”) introduced the Smartek chip to market in
October 2002. SCC had reverse engineered the authentication process used by
Lexmark’s hardware, and thus produced an inter-operable microchip that, in the eyes of a
Lexmark printer, appeared to function identically as one of Lexmark’s own microchips.
In order to achieve inter-operability, SCC copied wholesale portions of Lexmark’s
microchip code into their own product. This, it was claimed, was a necessary interoperability step due to the fact that the contents of the microchip’s code was copied into
the printer’s memory, and verified by the printer’s code. The printers were looking for
Lexmark’s code, and had they found anything else, they would have rejected the third
party microchip and its cartridge. Lexmark raised a DMCA claim because Lexmark
believed that SCC’s microchips circumvented a technological measure that controlled
access to Lexmark’s Toner Loading Programs.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court found that Lexmark’s microchip code was not
copyrightable, due primarily to its “lock-out” functionality, and even were it to be
copyrightable, SCC’s use would likely qualify as a fair use. The district court had
previously found that “Lexmark’s authentication sequence effectively ‘controls access’ to
the Toner Loading Programs and the Printer Engine Program because it controls the
consumer’s ability to make use of these programs.” 83
The Circuit Court disagreed and said that any consumer, could, if they had the skill,
copy the program from the printer’s memory, turn it into source code, and disseminate it
to the world. Importantly, the court also found that “[n]o security device . . . protects
access to the Printer Engine Program Code and no security device accordingly must be
circumvented to obtain access to that program code.” 84
The DMCA only applies to a technical measure that “controls access to a work
protected [by a copyright].” 85 As the court had already found that Lexmark’s microchip
code was not copyrightable, it concluded that the DMCA would not protect the code.
SCC could, therefore, not be held to have violated the DMCA by circumventing a
technological measure that controlled access to Lexmark’s Toner Loading Program.
D. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.

¶52

Chamberlain Group, Inc. (“Chamberlain”) manufactures a line of garage door
openers which contain an added security device featuring “rolling code” technology.
Conventional garage door openers are vulnerable to compromise by would-be criminals.
Burglars can passively intercept the code sent by the owner’s remote to the opener, copy
it, and use it at a later date to break into the home. Chamberlain’s “rolling code”
added).” Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights to James H. Billington, Librarian of
Congress 173 n.312 (Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registersrecommendation.pdf.
83
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp 2d 943, 968 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
84
Id. at 967.
85
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2006).
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technology changes the entry code after each use, thus defeating the “replay attack” that
other garage door openers were vulnerable to. 86
Skylink creates ansells universal remote controls that are compatible with multiple
garage door openers, including Chamberlain’s system. Skylink’s remotes bypass the
rolling code feature, and when coupled with Chamberlain’s openers, the system instead
acted as a conventional garage door opener system, in that the same code was used each
time. Thus, the system was again vulnerable to interception and replay. 87
Chamberlain sued Skylink under the DMCA, claiming that the rolling code
function of their software program served as “a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work.” 88 The work in question, they claimed, was an operating
function of the computer program that controls the garage door opening functionality.
Chamberlain claimed that the DMCA was being violated, as Skylink’s remote, they
claimed, circumvented those technological protection measures.
Chamberlain claimed in oral argument that “the DMCA overrode all pre-existing
consumer expectations about the legitimate uses of products containing copyrighted” and
that “pre-DMCA history in the [garage door opener] industry,” including the accepted
use of replacement universal remotes by consumers, is “irrelevant” as “all . . . uses of
products [that circumvent] a technological measure [that] controlled access are now per
se illegal under the DMCA unless the manufacturer provide[s] consumers with explicit
authorization.” 89 On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court disagreed, ruling that “the DMCA
did not ‘fundamentally alter’ the legal landscape governing the reasonable expectations
of consumers or competitors.” 90 It stated that “[t]he DMCA does not create a new
property right for copyright owners. Nor, for that matter, does it divest the public of the
property rights that the Copyright Act has long granted to the public.” 91 Furthermore,
“[a] copyright owner seeking to impose liability on an accused trafficker must
demonstrate that the trafficker’s device enables either copyright infringement or a
prohibited circumvention.” 92
Skylink was never alleged to have copied or infringed on Chamberlain’s
copyrighted works (the computer code contained within the garage door opener system).
Skylink’s circumvention of the rolling code feature was not in order to make an
infringing copy of that code but in order to inter-operate with it. In finding for Skylink,
the Federal Circuit Court further cemented the right to circumvent in order to build
compatible replacement aftermarket products.
E. Vivendi Universal v. Jung

¶57

Davidson & Associates, Inc. doing business as Blizzard Entertainment (“Blizzard”)
creates, markets, and sells several popular computer games including “StarCraft,”
“StarCraft: Brood War,” and “WarCraft II: Battle.net Edition.” Blizzard provides a 24
86

See Paul Syverson, A Taxonomy of Replay Attacks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1994 IEEE COMPUTER
SECURITY FOUNDATIONS WORKSHOP VII 187-191 (IEEE Computer Society Press 1994).
87
See generally Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
88
17 U.S.C. § 1201.
89
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193.
90
Id. at 1194.
91
Id. at 1204.
92
Id.
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hour online gaming service, Battle.net, for customers who purchased legitimate copies of
its games. The Battle.net service enabled the more than 12 million active users and
200,000 average concurrent users to play against each other over the Internet, instead of
competing against computer-controlled enemies, as is normally done in a single-player
game. While the online service was provided for free, Blizzard required that a customer
have a valid copy of one of its computer games by shipping a license key with each copy
of the game. The same license key could not be used multiple times concurrently on
Battle.net.
While the Battle.net service was free, it was not perfect, and in some ways, this
stemmed from its huge popularity. Frequent crashes, slow response times and a
proliferation of hacks and cheats were the most common complaints. 93 A group of
independent programmers founded the “bnetd” project, an alternative to Battle.net, which
they hoped would be free of the problems that had plagued Battle.net. It was released as
open source software, and was given away for free. The developers of bnetd had no
profit motive, and did not gain financially through the bnetd project.
The developers of bnetd did not have access to the database of compact disc (CD)
keys associated with legitimately purchased copies of Blizzard’s games. Thus, while
they did check for the presence of a CD key, they were unable to verify if a given key
was valid or not. They did not institute a check to see if the same key was being used by
multiple people at the same time. However, given the open-source development
methodology of bnetd and the fact that other people could set up game servers using the
freely distributed source code, creating a database of currently valid CD keys would have
been difficult, not to mention easy to evade.
Furthermore, due to the fact that the only authentication measure to connect to
Blizzard’s official Battle.net server was a CD key, it meant that anyone operating a bnetd
server could themselves learn the CD keys of each person connecting to his or her server.
Thus, by using one’s real CD key on a bnetd server, a user reveals the one secret which
could then be used to keep them from connecting to the legitimate Battle.net server in the
future.
Blizzard filed suit and alleged that the bnetd developers violated the DMCA.
Blizzard claimed that by circumventing Blizzard’s CD key authentication “handshake,”
bnetd’s server permitted unauthorized access to the “Battle.net mode” within Blizzard
games. Blizzard claimed that bnetd was “circumventing a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected [by the DMCA]” and that the bnetd
software was thus prohibited as a technology “primarily designed or produced” for
circumvention. 94 Blizzard’s argument, essentially, was that each game had two portions
of computer code: a single player mode and a multi-player, which was, of course,
Battle.net mode. By providing an alternate server for users to connect to, the bnetd
developers were allowing unauthorized access to the multi-player portion of the game,
without the usual CD key check taking place. In addition to running afoul of the DMCA,
93

“Battle.net’s popularity has been one of its great drawbacks. Frequent crashes and slow response
times due to a huge crush of players — especially right after the release of a new game — can often make
Battle.net an unpleasant experience. The technical problems are exacerbated by social malfunctions: the
malicious killing of some gamers by other players and the proliferation of hacks that give some players
unfair advantages.” Howard Wen, Battle.net Goes to War, SALON.COM, Apr. 18, 2002,
http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/04/18/bnetd/.
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the bnetd developers were also accused of violating the end user license agreement
(EULA) that one was required to agree to before installing any of Blizzard’s games.
These shrinkwrap licenses forbade any kind of reverse engineering.
¶62
The bnetd developers responded by claiming that the Battle.net portion of the code
was not copyrightable, that the code underlying that portion of the game was part of the
overall game software, and that any user who had purchased the game had full access to
that code in order to run it on his or her computer. Bnetd further claimed that they had
only circumvented Blizzard’s CD key access control technology for the purpose of
achieving inter-operability between Blizzard’s game software and bnetd’s software. The
Eighth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the lower court decision that the bnetd developers
had circumvented Blizzard’s copy protection, violating the DMCA. 95
¶63
The outcome of the case is particularly interesting, given the non-commercial
nature of the project. There was no corporation to find responsible, no ill-gotten profits.
As a result of the case Blizzard was able to have the bnetd internet domain name
(bnetd.org) transferred, such that all requests to the website would be redirected to
Blizzard’s own Battle.net website. 96 Although Blizzard won the case, the bnetd source
code continued to be distributed freely online, beyond the physical borders of the United
States, in countries where anti-circumvention legislation does not exist. 97 A derivative
project, or “fork,” of the bnetd project’s source code was created. This project is hosted
and based in Germany and has an active and thriving community of users and
developers. 98
IV. ANALYSIS
¶64

The purpose of this section is to take a realistic look at the issues presented thus far
in the paper. First, the issue of customers hacking or modifying subsidized durable goods
(“The Razor”) will be addressed. The issue of competitors creating compatible
aftermarket goods (“The Blade”) will then be discussed.
A. The Razor

¶65

The Razor problem primarily stems from companies choosing to place their trust
and make a financial investment in customers with whom they have no prior or
contractual relationship. Traditional mobile phone service companies subsidize the cost
of handsets but then require that their customers sign a contract with a significant
termination fee should the customer wish to end their service. Thus, these companies can
be sure that they will recoup their investment, either through ongoing subscription fees or
a termination fee. In order to further restrict their potential losses, these companies
95

Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 631 (8th Cir. 2005).
The Internet domain name www.bnetd.org will now take you to Blizzard’s own website,
http://www.blizzard.net. See Battle.net, http://www.bnetd.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
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2007).
98
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require that their customers have a good credit rating, so that the threat of a termination
fee or negative credit report will be taken seriously. 99
¶66
Prepaid phones and gaming consoles are just two of the many subsidized projects
that adopt the unknown customer subsidization business model, and due to the fact that
they target younger customers, and those with irregular income patterns, the termination
fee and contract model will simply not work. The prepaid phone companies take great
efforts to advertise that their phones do not require any contract.100 Since the Librarian of
Congress issued a DMCA exception to those who wish to hack their phones, the prepaid
phone market has not collapsed. Subsidized phones are still available to customers, but
instead, the vendors have adapted. Consumers may now only buy two or three phones
per store-visit, 101 and the phone manufacturers have released new phones that are more
difficult to unlock. It is, of course, an arms race, as hackers will work to discover new
methods of phone unlocking. With a profit of $50 per subsidized handset, they have a
strong financial incentive to find a way. Tracfone has also filed suit against the Librarian
of Congress to reverse the recently introduced DMCA exception. 102
¶67
One clear lesson can be learned from the business cases presented earlier in this
paper. A common theme that can be seen with both Microsoft’s Xbox and Netpliance’s
i-Opener is that the Linux/open source developers community makes for a considerable
adversary. If a single DRM system protects a product against both piracy and open
source hackers tinkering with the product, the odds do not bode well for the anti-piracy
system’s success. This very design flaw was present in both the Xbox as well as the
DVD system. Companies should either embrace the Linux community or, at the very
least, design a separate DRM system that keeps the Linux hackers at bay.
1. Contract Law
¶68

The Netpliance customers who hacked their i-Opener were violating the shrinkwrap
license that they had accepted when they opened the box. Likewise, the Xbox purchasers
or the prepaid phone customers would have violated a license, should the vendors have
chosen to include one in the packaging. While the companies may have some kind of
claim against their customers for violating the contract, for the most part, it is a moot
point.
¶69
If a customer is able to purchase the item in cash, in person, without ever
establishing a permanent relationship with the company, there is no practical method by
which the company can identify the customer and, thus, go after them for violating the
terms of the contract. This assumes, of course, that the company has a way of
determining that the customer has indeed violated the contract, as it is exceedingly
99

See generally Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 389 (2007).
“T-Mobile prepaid plans give you wireless access with less commitment, so you can pay — and talk
— as you go. With no annual contract, no credit check, and no monthly bill, prepaid plans are a simple,
direct way to go mobile.” Prepaid Calling Plans: T-Mobile To Go Pay As You Go, http://www.tmobile.com/shop/plans/default.aspx?plancategory=4 (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
101
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complaints that entrepreneurs are buying the subsidized handsets by the hundreds to resell at a profit,
according to people familiar with the matter.” Bruce Meyerson, Wal-Mart Limits Prepaid Cell Phones to
2, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15335329/.
102
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difficult to find out what happens to a product once a customer takes it home. There is a
big difference between hacking an Xbox and leaving it unopened in the original box.
However, from the financial perspective of the manufacturer, both of these situations
have the same impact: a wasted subsidy.
2. Who Can You Go After?
¶70

Tracfone claims to have lost millions of dollars through customers who
reprogrammed their phones. 103 Netpliance’s i-Opener was a commercial flop and large
numbers of the purchasers of the product were those who solely wished to hack it. Xbox
was a commercial success, although Microsoft clearly lost money on every Linux hacker
who bought the console only to then hack it.
¶71
Assuming that the companies are able to compile a list of who their customers are,
and which of them have hacked their devices, the next question to be asked is what can
the companies then do, and who can they go after?
¶72

a) Go after the customers. — Suing individual customers is not a particularly
effective strategy, even if they have cost you money. It is a strategy that has been widely
used by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) in its campaign against
unauthorized copying of music. The campaign has won the RIAA scorn and negative
publicity, especially in the more extreme cases when they have gone after a 12-year-old
child, 104 a 71-year-old grandfather, 105 and the deceased. 106 Bad publicity aside, it is
impossible to sue hundreds of thousands of people, and even if one could, it is unlikely
that they, their family, or their friends would ever turn into legitimate customers
afterwards.

¶73

b) Go after those who create the hack. — Some in academia have recently begun
to write about the impact of so called “Superusers.” 107 While thousands of independent
programmers have worked on the Linux operating system, most DRM circumvention is
done by a handful of skilled individual users. Some commentators justify the DMCA’s
fairly Draconian rules by pointing to the threat that a single skilled programmer can pose
to a DRM system, and thus a company’s bottom line.
¶74
The computer programmer who reverse engineered the DRM system that protected
DVDs was a teenager from Sweden. He was beyond the jurisdictional limits of the US
legal system. While the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) exerted
pressure to have him charged, his case was later thrown out by a Swedish judge. 108
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While it is possible to go after Americans who reverse engineer, it is quite easy for
them to anonymously release their information. 109 Aggressive activities by software
companies against those in the computer security community have done much to
encourage the anonymous release of security vulnerability information. It has not
stopped the disclosure of research but forced those security experts to release their work
anonymously, and not to work with the companies directly. 110

¶76

c) Go after those who share information detailing the hack, and distribute it online.
— Unable to go after the creator of the hack, the MPAA then attempted to shut-down
U.S. based website operators who posted copies, or even links to other copies of the
code. 111 These individuals did not reverse engineer the DRM system themselves but
were merely providing a link so that others could download and then use the code. The
court surprised many commentators when it sided with the MPAA, and one of the
website operators was forced to remove the links from his site. The DeCSS source code
is still widely available on the Internet, both from servers outside the United States, 112
and sites within the US. 113 In particular, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University who
provided expert testimony at the CSS trial still has the source code on his official
university homepage. 114
¶77
While the MPAA won its lawsuit, the only long term effect was to incentivize
politically aware Internet users to engage in a modern form of civil disobedience by
making copies available on their own websites (“mirroring”). This has happened on a
number of occasions, including Diebold’s electronic voting machine source code, 115
confidential internal documents belonging to Church of Scientology, 116 and the DRM
system used by the HD-DVD platform. 117 Even in the highly unlikely case where a
copyright holder was able to use the DMCA and other tools to force every webmaster in
the world to remove circumvention information, censorship resistant anonymous
publishing systems have already been designed and deployed that would further frustrate
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such a censorship effort. 118 Where there is no profit motive and thus no money trail to
follow and where information is being given out for the “hack value” or pleasure of
reverse engineering, it will be next to impossible to put the proverbial genie back into the
bottle. Cyber-activist John Gilmore accurately described the futility of attempting to
force webmasters to take down content when he stated, “The Net interprets censorship as
damage and routes around it.” 119
3. Fixing the Problem with Technology
¶78

Technology and, in particular, information security in particular, are always an
arms race. Worse, it is an unfair playing field, where the hackers and tinkers are engaged
in a form of asymmetric warfare with technology companies. Unfortunately for the
manufacturers to be successful, they must defend themselves every single time to protect
their business model while the hackers only need to succeed once. The companies have a
limited quantity of development man-hours, while an army of open source programmers
toil away at breaking the DRM system in their seemingly unlimited spare time. The odds
are stacked against those companies trying to design an effective DRM system. It is for
this reason that there are very few, if any, DRM success stories.
¶79
Microsoft clearly learned from its Xbox experience, and thus its more recent
platform the Xbox 360 shipped with a much stronger DRM system. Predictably, a group
of Linux hackers were again able to reverse engineer this system and get Linux booting
on the new gaming system. 120 Microsoft did at least learn enough to de-align the various
groups. Hobbyists can now play their own “homebrew” games on the Xbox without
having to resort to reverse engineering. In permitting this kind of activity, Microsoft has
at least removed one group who would otherwise be hard at work attacking their DRM
technology.
¶80
In the end, the strategy of selling a subsidized good to a complete stranger may
prove to be a very risky one. For those companies that are able to create strong enough
protection systems, high profits will await them. For those whose protections are
cracked, their bottom line may suffer. To those potential manufacturers thinking of
adopting the unknown customer subsidized durable good business model, caveat
venditor.
B. The Blade
¶81

Based on the post-DMCA case history, the courts seem to have taken the position
that the DRM in hardware items cannot be protected through anti-circumvention rules.
Examples of this have so far included garage door openers and printers, but could grow to
include car parts, cameras, and coffee makers. For those companies manufacturing
physical durable goods, they may have to seek other methods of going after those
competitors who make compatible goods. One other major printer manufacturer seems to
118
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have recognized the failings of the DMCA to protect this business model, and has instead
opted to use patent law to go after aftermarket print cartridge manufacturers. 121
¶82
While the bnetd decision is just one case, it seems that the courts are taking a
completely different view when it comes to software products and their aftermarkets.
The software market is more interesting, primarily due to the distribution costs brought
about through the information economy. It is very difficult to make replacement printer
cartridges for free; however, a group of hobbyist programmers can quite easily create a
software product and make it available online for free. This is primarily due to the nearzero cost of distributing goods online.
¶83
The stakes for electronic good manufacturers are now higher than ever before.
Blizzard, which previously gave away access to its Blizzard.net service for free, now
charges more than eight million active customers $15 per month for access to its World
of Warcraft online services. 122 . While the company previously was merely defending its
right to control the user experience, any project similar to bnetd for the company’s World
of Warcraft game would now significantly threaten its revenue stream.
1. Financially Motivated Versus Open Source Competitors in Software Aftermarkets
¶84

In the case of software durable goods, if a company makes a competing aftermarket
product, the company producing the primary durable good should be able to use the
DMCA to go after its competitor. That, at least, is the precedent that bnetd has set.
However, if a compatible aftermarket good has been created and released for free by
hobbyists on the Internet, there is very little that the manufacturer can do to shut its new
competitors down. As previously explained in the Razor section, the DMCA does not
reach beyond the physical borders of the United States. Furthermore, while it can be
used against US based programmers, this merely forces them to adopt pseudonyms and
release their code anonymously. As is always the case, it is far easier to go after a
competitor who has a physical presence, a bank account, and physical assets. Going after
open-source programmers is the Internet equivalent of being the weaker side in
asymmetric warfare. The stronger opponent, a distributed network of programmers, will
dodge and evade any takedown efforts.
2. A Moral Right To Hack?

¶85

While those companies making prepaid phones may not be able to do anything to
stop customers from purchasing their phones, resetting the software, and then reselling
them, it is worth exploring the question of morality. Simply put: is it “right” to do what
these men did, when they bought 1000 phones, wiped their software, and re-sold them?
Is it morally right to buy an Xbox, and then turn it into a cheap living room entertainment
system? Likewise, is it morally right to buy a subsidized printer and then only purchase
third-party cartridges for it? By and large, the morality question is the same for those
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who hack the razor and for those who seek cheaper compatible blades. Is it right to buy a
subsidized good and then knowingly stop the company from recouping its investment?
¶86
The two extremes can be seen in the case of the Netpliance i-Opener and the
Lexmark prebate printers. Netpliance sold only one kind of i-Opener: one that was
subsidized. Thus, any customer that wished to purchase one and put Linux on it had to
essentially take money from Netpliance’s pocket. Lexmark, on the other hand, sold
multiple printers, and only applied a DRM scheme to their subsidized models.
Customers who wished to use third-party print cartridges with their printers could buy a
full price printer, and customers who were willing to be restricted to Lexmark’s own
cartridges could purchase the subsidized printer. The problems for Lexmark arose when
customers greedily wished to use a subsidized printer with cheap third-party ink.
¶87
It is very easy to sympathize with the Linux hackers who reverse engineered the iOpener, those who wished to get Linux running on their Xbox, or those who reverse
engineered the DVD DRM scheme so that they could play legitimately purchased DVDs
on their Linux home computers. In all three of these cases, customers essentially had a
binary choice: purchase the system, or don’t. If any kind of “right to reverse engineer” or
“right to hack” argument can be made, it should apply to these customers.
¶88
However, those who wished to evade the DRM system used by Lexmark are on
much shakier moral ground. If a company sells two different models: one subsidized and
locked via DRM, and another sold at a modest and reasonable profit, it is very difficult to
make a solid argument for a right to hack. The consumer then, after all, has a perfectly
reasonable means by which they can purchase an unencumbered product. Those who
choose to purchase the subsidized product and then strive to strip out the DRM are then
engaged, essentially, in theft. They are not defending a right to hack but are merely
unfairly leeching resources from another company. This is clearly wrong.
V. CONCLUSION
¶89

This paper has explored a number of issues related to risky business models in
which companies sell unsubsidized, technology-based consumer goods and then
hopefully recover their investment through aftermarket sales. Such companies often end
up fighting off competitors wishing to leverage the company’s subsidized platform to sell
their own compatible aftermarket products. They can also end up fighting their own
customers who wish to use the products in creative, but unprofitable ways. For the
company producing and subsidizing the items, both situations can lead to the same end
result: financial losses for a subsidized good which will not lead to future sales.
¶90
Companies wishing to follow this business model must take care, as it is a
potentially profitable, yet extremely dangerous strategy. Selling to customers with whom
a company has no prior business relationship, and often has no means of reliably
identifying, can be financial suicide. It is simply too easy for parasitic businesses to take
advantage of a company’s subsidization to make their own businesses profit — be they
mobile phone resellers or makers of printer ink cartridges.
¶91
This paper also explored a number of case histories of failed products that utilized
Digital Rights Management technology to try and keep tinkering customers at bay. In all
of the cases presented, open source programmers were able to out-wit and out-engineer
the companies manufacturing locked-down products. The lesson from such cases is
clear: if the financial success of a product depends on keeping motivated Linux hackers
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from successfully accessing the guts of the device, its manufacturer may want to go back
to the drawing board. At the very least, companies should not use the same DRM
technology to deny access to both open-source hobbyists wishing to tinker with the
device and also software-copying pirates wishing to avoid paying for the company’s own
high-priced aftermarket items.
¶92
Furthermore, while the law (be it a shrinkwrap contract or the DMCA) may be on
the side of the companies producing these goods, in reality, their options for defending
themselves and their business models are quite limited. Suing your customers will not
accomplish much beyond ruining your reputation, while those advanced users who
actually reverse engineer the products and share the information of the hack are often
either in another country, or post the information to the Internet anonymously.
¶93
New laws will not help to shore up the subsidized razor and blade business model.
Likewise, there will be no unbreakable DRM magic bullet to protect such products from
hackers, curious customers, and parasitic competitors. It’s a dangerous market — but
with the possibility of reaching the large untapped market of customers for whom
relationships and credit histories are not an option, many companies may still choose to
take the risk. Caveat venditor.
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